The Sunni-Shia Divide, Saudi Arabia - Iran Relations, and the War in Ukraine

Mar 20

Mar 20 The Sunni-Shia Divide, Saudi Arabia - Iran Relations, and the War in Ukraine

Relations between Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shia-dominant Iran have been strained due to a long history of ethnic tension, political division, and the involvement of external influence from actors ranging from western powers to terrorist organisations. The prevalence of this historical tension underpins current affairs between the two countries and has culminated into a hostile relationship with serious implications for regional stability and global geopolitics. On the international stage, Iran and Saudi Arabia are actively engaged in a geopolitical battle, utilizing alliances through competing great powers.

The divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims is the oldest and largest in the history of Islam. The Sunnis represent 85-90% of the Muslim population at 1.5 billion; most are in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. The Shia Muslims comprise a significantly smaller percentage at 10%, totalling at 154-200 million. The Shia population is largely in Iran, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, and Yemen. The history of the division stems from the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 when the Shia claimed that Ali was his rightful successor. Ali was assassinated in 661 after a 5-year rule as a caliphate filled with violence and civil war. He was succeeded by his sons Hassan and Hussein. While Hassan was believed to be poisoned in 680, Hassan was killed on the battlefield by the Umayyads in 681, initiating the Shia’s focus on martyrdom and grief. Although different, the two sects are united in their belief in the 5 pillars of Islam: profession of faith (shahada), prayer (salat), alms (zakat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj). While these tenants are shared, war, political conflict, and ethnic tension have marred united sentiment and continued to pit Muslim sects against one another.

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 catalysed Iran’s rise to power through the replacement of the Shah by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s mission to improve Iran’s power status in the region through Shia Islam shocked Saudi Arabia and introduced both geopolitical and economic competition into a region already heavily divided. Iran’s foreign policy stance became more aggressive as they began to back other Shia-led political forces throughout the Middle East. Some of these proxies led to conflict as Iran equipped armed groups throughout the region, including Syria’s Hafez al-Assad. This coincided with the Saddam era in Iraq, a region initially dominated by the minority Sunni population until power was heavily contested by the Shia after he was overthrown. This plunged the region into further divide and instigating an onslaught of terrorist attacks. Iraq endures more terrorist attacks than any country with 3,000 cases in 2016 alone. The perpetuation of this conflict and the rise in terrorism was exacerbated by the Yemen and Syrian civil wars.

The Yemen Civil War between rebel Shia Houthi forces and the Sunni-led government provided a battleground for the Iranian v Saudi Arabia conflict, with Iran backing the Houthi and Saudi Arabia the Sunni government. With terrorist groups actively involved in the conflict, Al-Qaeda utilized its presence to improve their power in the region and expand into Saudi Arabia. This initiated significant duress for the Saudis who now faced Shia Houthi fighters at its border, illegal immigration, and the threat of Al-Qaeda destabilizing their government. Time only worsened the stability of the region as the Arab Spring began in 2010 and the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011. The Syrian Civil War continued as an outlet for Iranian v Saudi Arabia aggression with Iran backing the Assad regime and Saudi Arabia funding Sunni rebel groups. The scale and violence of the Syrian Civil War introduced more external actors, including Russia, the US, and Turkey with military intervention and involvement. The cataclysmic uprisings of the Arab Spring caused the destabilisation of numerous countries and failed to end in reform and unification within the region.

The protracted civil wars in member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), including Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, and Libya deposed rulers, caused further divide, and highlighted the stability and power of Saudi Arabia. In the 2013 Cairo Islamic Summit, Madani, a Saudi national, was appointed secretary general of the OIC, granting Saudi Arabia considerable international standing and leadership capability. Madani strived to form alliances and unite the region through common Islamic values, yet the destabilisation of several countries through the Iraq invasion and the spread of violent terrorism formed a significant barrier to reunification. Although Madani’s efforts through the OIC aimed to solve conflict within the region, Saudi Arabia largely used the organisation for personal political gain, especially after Iranian nuclear talks and the subsequent Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015 with other world powers. Riyadh began implementing fear tactics to win support against Tehran within the OIC, using financial aid to garner alliances. This reality threatens the notion that the OIC can work beyond sectarian divides to form a united regional front. While its mission may aim for unity, its history paints it as a mechanism for Saudi Arabian financial and regional manipulation.

The presence and interference of the United States is largely prevalent throughout these tumultuous time periods and has played a crucial role in the divide between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In January 2020, the US assassinated Iranian General and Commander of the Quds forces, Qassem Soleimani in a drone strike in Baghdad. The Iranian government responded with a renewed vow in 2023 to avenge the death of the commander and has implemented new sanctions on current and former UK and German officials who were allegedly involved. The president called Soleimani a ‘champion of fighting terrorism and global arrogance’ encouraging protests and public demonstrations. This assassination was not the first high profile execution, with Saudi Arabia killing prominent Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in 2016; an act unacknowledged by the OIC. Al-Nimr was a vocal Shia supporter, encouraging anti-government protests in the Eastern Province where Shia face persecution. The Sheikh met US officials in 2008 to distance himself from anti-American rhetoric and forge peaceful ties. His execution was labelled a ‘grave mistake’ by the Lebanon Shia Council and cultivated additional animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Iran has faced recent backlash due to their involvement in the war in Ukraine, allegedly supplying Russia with ammunition. The US national security council has reported that Russia and Iran are seeking joint production of lethal drones. Prior to this report, Australia had placed sanctions on three Iranians and one Iranian business for the supply of drones to Russia. US National Security Council spokesman, John Kirby, says ‘Iran has become Russia’s top military backer…’ and Russia’s use of Iranian drones has led to the destruction of essential energy infrastructure. In return, Putin has offered technical and military support, a direct threat to opposing Middle Eastern governments, including Saudi Arabia, and, as perceived by the US, a threat to international security.

From the Iranian perspective, Putin’s assistance in support of Bashar Assad in Syria has prompted them to return the favor. In 2015, General Qassem Suleimani travelled to Russia to convince Putin to intervene to save the Assad regime and provide air power and intelligence to the crumbling governmental system. The request was successful and maintained Russia’s allyship with Syria. While Iran initially held a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine, this position has recently shifted. Having recognized Ukrainian independence in 1991 and establishing diplomatic ties in 1992, relations between the two states were strong. Iran has continued a theme of neutrality, taking a backseat approach and abstaining from taking a stance on the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The beginning of the Ukraine war had Iran cautious as the Islamic Republic does not recognize independence for the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. However, as time passed, the effect of sanctions plunged Russia and Iran into joint economic isolation and transformed their relationship from energy competitors to allies in energy diplomacy. Russian sanctions have proven beneficial to Iran’s trade routes through a new agreement set from the eastern edge of Europe to the Indian Ocean. Now, Iran admits the supply to Russia of military machinery and assistance following Russia’s loss in territory and troops. The launch of surface-to-surface missiles and the Kheybar-Shekan missile system unveiled in September 2022 boast a range of 1,400 kilometres with high levels of manoeuvrability. On the US front, Iranian missiles have been stopped and confiscated, causing the US to seek precedent from 2020 on the redirection of weaponry to instead divert them to Ukraine’s defense. While Nasr al-Din Amir, the Houthi deputy information minister scoffed at the US idea and branded it ineffective, the move carries substantial symbolic weight as a statement against Iran’s alliance with Russia. With Iran providing Russia with ballistic missiles and suicide drones, this is an opportunity for the US to turn the tides and demonstrate their commitment to thwarting Russian attacks against Ukraine.

For the rest of the Middle East, this conflict is framed as ‘European’ in nature and releasing condemnation of Russia’s actions is unlikely. For Saudi Arabia, their stance of neutrality is largely defiant of the US as they refuse to align themselves against Russia to send the message that their affairs are not subject to the aims and pressure of the West powers. Former US ambassador to Yemen, Gerald Feierstein, emphasizes the Saudis aim to ‘avoid entanglement in what is referred to in the US as ‘great power competition.’’ Furthermore, Russia remains their key partner in OPEC+ following the alliance in 2017. This has represented a significant conflict of interest demonstrated at the beginning of the Ukrainian war, when the Saudi Arabian Holding Co, controlled by billionaire Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal, invested over $500 million in Gazprom, Rosneft and Lukoil. While the investment firm was likely seeking undervalued assets, this happened almost simultaneously to western sanctions on Russian energy firms. The neutrality asserted by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States has frustrated the west and undermined economic sanctions.

The diminishing presence of the US in the Middle East and the constant transformation of alliances between the Gulf States has seen substantial effects from the war in Ukraine. Following the ‘light footprint’ from the Obama administration strategy, room for non-state transnational actors, including the Houthi movement, has emerged to pursue independent geopolitical goals, often reinforcing religious sectarian divides in the region. The disengagement from the US has opened a partial power vacuum that both Iran and Saudi Arabia, with vying influence from the UAE and Qatar are seeking to fill. The war in Ukraine has introduced economic incentive for both powers and reengaged the west in geopolitical contestation with the Gulf states. The result of this shift in balance of power dynamics will play out as the war in Ukraine continues and the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue to be tested.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.