The Unknown Unknown: The Vulnerability of Global Governments to Unanticipated Events
Avid followers of international politics, what would you say is the greatest security threat that the world faces over the next fifteen years? In a recent talk at the University of St Andrews, asked this very question, the UK Government’s Cabinet Secretary and National Security Advisor, Sir Mark Sedwill, answered: the unknown unknown. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the September 11th attacks, the Arab Spring, he said, were all events which were instrumental in shaping the current international order, but they were equally all sudden, unanticipated events prophesied by no one. Therefore, a central yet under-asked question with regards to future security threats is how prepared are governments today to react to the next unknown unknown? Are they sufficiently prepared for the unpreparable?
It appears that they are not. Firstly, consider the degree of ideological polarisation within electorates nowadays, which subsequently elect ideologically centred governments blind to pragmatism. As research by the Pew Research Centre shows, communities are hardening their ideological positions; with left-leaning voters becoming more solidly left, mirroring an identical pattern emerging on the right of the political spectrum. Consequently, the wiggle room for Prime Ministers and Presidents is becoming smaller and smaller because their political viability rests on pleasing these idealist core voters rather than necessarily doing the rational thing. Limiting one’s options after unpredictability has already restricted those options is far from optimising a foreign policy response. One only has to refer to the Hungarian response to the refugee crisis in 2015 to have a glimpse of the degree to which governments are advocating ideologically driven policies in times of crises instead of reaching compromisable and pragmatic solutions: it hastily closed its borders and doubled down on right-wing, anti-migration rhetoric pleasing its core voters and politicising a humanitarian emergency. In summation, Arthur Vandenberg’s aspiration of ensuring that “politics stops at the water’s edge” is not remotely close to being achieved currently, which has the result of constructing an environment where the unknown unknown would unleash an emotional response, rather than a pragmatic and calculated one, at a time of great strategic importance. Optimisation of foreign policy is in danger of being swapped for political gratification.
A second concern is the highly bureaucratic nature of governments, which limits their scope for a rapid response to time-sensitive scenarios. Think about the fall of the Berlin Wall: the Bush presidency had a matter of hours to formulate a plan which would lie at the foundations of the American unipolar world order, marking international politics for the subsequent generation. Compare this level of bureaucratic swiftness and decisiveness with the UK government’s lethargic response to the 3 Hs: HS2, Huawei and Heathrow’s third runway. True, these are contentious, multi-faceted issues with a plurality of affected parties which partly justifies a measured response; after all, why rush if there is no time limit? But what if Prime Minister Johnson did face a time limit and had to make an immediate decision regarding a complex scenario which would be equally contentious and multi-faceted? Would these same sluggish internal structures allow him to act proactively in such a circumstance? It is currently unclear. Consequently, optimal foreign policy responses to the unknown unknown could be curtailed by bureaucratic inefficiencies strongly suggesting that governments today are not sufficiently flexible to coherently react to unexpected events.
The final concern raised is the most alarming. A paradox is emerging: the unknown unknowns are becoming more and more global in their impacts – for example, the worldwide ramifications of the 2008 financial crisis – but at the same time, governments are becoming less and less likely to cooperate with one another through international institutions to tackle these ever-globalising issues. Simply put, unilateralism cannot and will not solve the future unknown unknowns. Consider the current outbreak of COVID-19. It is unquestionably an international emergency but there has been very little, if any, coordination of strategies between states. Granted, different countries are at different stages of the outbreak, but this does not prevent an intertwined or integrated response. If anything, it necessitates just that. How often have we heard interventions from the UN Secretary General, read policy initiatives by the WHO in the last 3 months, or seen the convention of the G20 to formulate a united strategy? We have rarely experienced these institutions’ presence because they have been made irrelevant by state unilateralism. Given these institutions’ levels of expertise, ability to facilitate cooperation, and communication networks, it is concerning how trivial a role they have played. This is tangible evidence that governments are failing to utilise all of the tools at their disposal in reacting to unknown unknowns, highlighting that they are not sufficiently prepared to tackle such events in the most effective way.
What needs to be done to correct this situation? The first thing to note is that all of the problems underlined are structural problems; they concern the ways in which governments operate rather than the specific actions which they undertake. Therefore, the solution lies in changing the approach of international governance, so as to allow them to position themselves in stronger positions to react decisively and pragmatically to future events.
Pragmatism is the first solution. Governments must be bold enough to make unpopular decisions, while electorates must learn to accept such unpopular yet necessary decisions and refrain from punishing pragmatism at the polls. This inherently requires the depoliticisation of unknown unknowns, a return to the end of politics at the water’s edge. The Italian government’s decision to lockdown the entire country in reaction to COVID-19 is a shining example of such ‘grown-up’ politics.
The second solution lies in bureaucratic flexibility. Internal governmental structures must be flexible enough to allow rapid cross-departmental communication and information gathering, and most importantly, support decisive decision-making. This can largely be achieved by streamlining the decision-making process through establishing a centralised governmental monitoring body, thus removing the internal struggles for power.
The last solution is for governments to cooperate through international institutions once more. Not only will this contribute to the proliferation of cross-border information to inform optimal decision-making, but it will also facilitate a cohesive and unified international response that sufficiently tackles the inevitable international nature of future unknown unknowns. If governments prioritise pragmatism over idealism, flexibility over rigidity, and cooperation over unilateralism, their ability to react decisively to future unknown unknowns will markedly improve. This would unquestionably benefit everyone.
