The Wagner Group & Its Role in African International Relations

Oct 3

Oct 3 The Wagner Group & Its Role in African International Relations

As the war in Ukraine rages on, recent footage of Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the secret Russian paramilitary group known as ‘Wagner,’ ‘Wagner Group,’ or ‘Wagner PMC’ (to be referred to as Wagner for the remainder of this article), emerged from inside a Russian prison. In it, Prigozhin promises prisoners that if they serve six months in Ukraine, they will be freed, before threatening “if you arrive in Ukraine and decide it’s not for you, we will execute you.” This message is indicative of the work that Wagner does– shadowy mercenary duties to advance the foreign policy aims of the Kremlin.

Officially, Wagner does not exist. Indeed, its origins are nebulous at best. The group first appeared fighting in Luhansk in 2014 and was supposedly founded by Dmitry Utkin, a purported Neo-Nazi who allegedly named the group after Hitler’s favourite composer. Prigozhin –one of Putin’s closest allies-- is largely considered to be Wagner’s middleman and admitted to founding the group on Monday, September 26th. Prigozhin has significant experience in running disinformation campaigns as the founder of the ‘troll-factory’ known as the ‘Internet Research Agency’ leading to an indictment for his interference in the 2016 election.

Whilst many may be aware of Wagner’s presence in Ukraine, with news regarding their orders to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky having recently come to light as a continuation of their directive since 2014, their actions in Africa and the Middle East are far more underreported. Specifically, their actions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali are some of the more tangible examples, but Wagner has been prevalent in Angola, Burkina Faso, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Syria, and Zimbabwe. Across these African states, a common three-tiered approach used by Wagner has become apparent. First, disinformation campaigns, especially conducted through Prigozhin’s fake-news operations, are waged. Second, Wagner acquires payment through concessions in extractive industries, such as precious metal mining, usually employing Prigozhin or other Russian-owned companies. Third, and arguably most importantly, Wagner becomes involved with the states’ military, creating a direct linkage to the Russian military through myriad tactics, including training and advising, as well as anti-insurgency measures.

The CAR, led by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, has recently been involved heavily with Russia, as well as with Wagner in recent years. Two decades of continuous conflict in the CAR has led to minimal government control outside of the non-provincial capitals. As such, the Touadéra government has sought out aid from both Russia and Wagner since 2017, after UN peacekeepers were unable to extend the government’s control outside of the capital. Of course, Touadéra has denied any contract being signed with Wagner, despite US sanctions being levelled against companies working on Prigozhin’s behalf to “advance Russia’s influence in the Central African Republic.” Indeed, significant quantities of Russian weapons and trainers have moved into CAR, with estimates of over 2,000 stationed personnel, alongside numerous reports of human rights abuses in late 2019.

In late 2020, the role of Wagner in CAR significantly ramped up. The Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), formed by former president François Bozizé after his presidential candidacy was rejected, sought to overthrow the government of Touadéra. CPC-aligned militias, in the wake of Touadéra’s re-election, controlled roughly two-thirds of the country and sought to oust Touadéra in January; an attempt which failed. The subsequent counterattack led by Wagner and CAR Armed Forces (FACA) against the CPC lead to a reclamation of state territory through late 2020 as both sides combined to reach most rebel strongholds by April. Despite these major successes against insurgents, major concerns over the human rights abuses were raised in both March and October, with the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), reporting summary executions, torture, and forced disappearances perpetrated by Wagner, recording over 180 events of civilian targeting events. Wagner has repeatedly been condemned in the past for their actions in other African states, and this is no exception; an independent government report commissioned by Touadéra confirmed these abuses. Moreover, much of the violence perpetrated by the group is indiscriminate towards Muslims, especially those of Fulani origin, who are seen as supposed insurgents, despite evidence to the contrary. The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world, and the resurgent violence prompted by Wagner is only serving to exacerbate the need for relief required by over 60% of the CAR’s population, as well as hindering efforts to achieve this relief.

Similarly, Mali has had insurgency problems caused by religious and political divisions that have raged for over a decade. Since 2012, France has intervened through Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane in supporting the Malian government. However French forces have been withdrawn as of 2021, citing the Malian junta that has emerged after its two coups d’état since August of 2020. Wagner, in the wake of this, has involved itself in Mali, deploying its three-tiered approach once again. Maxim Shugaley, an associate of Prigozhin, has engaged in a campaign through an organisation sanctioned for disinformation activities, releasing polls showing “87 percent support among Malians” for Wagner’s involvement in Mali. The Russian-Malian military-to-military relationship has similarly grown, as 1000 ‘contractors’ from Wagner were accepted in September of 2020, alongside a “donation” of several helicopters and weapons in January of 2021. In exchange for this, Wagner would gain access to three mining deposits as compensation, as well as $10.8 million a month.

Through its activity in Mali, Wagner has continued its civilian-targeting approach prevalent in the CAR, with over 71% of its engagements in political violence, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), being violence targeting civilians. Furthermore, the group has introduced new tactics for Malian government forces, using booby traps and mines (actions against international law) as they had in the CAR & Libya. Moreover, much of the civilian violence has been perpetrated against Fulani communities, falsely claiming their links to armed groups. However, much of the violence conducted in Mali, especially civilian targeting, has been alongside Malian state forces, contrary to the violence in the CAR that Wagner has perpetrated. Even then, the group has recently been reported to have targeted civilians independent of state forces – two reports in May of raiding and pillaging two separate villages have recently come to light. Regardless, much of the fallout from Wagner’s involvement in Mali is yet to be seen, as the group’s continued involvement will undoubtedly lead to further threats to civilian safety and chaos in West Africa.

In conclusion, the Kremlin will not refrain from using any means necessary to advance its aims across the world, as exemplified by its deployment of the Wagner Group in African states. The group’s targeting of civilians, both alongside state forces in Mali and away from them in the CAR, has shown their willingness to commit human rights abuses to further their goals. Ultimately, we must remain cognizant of the use of groups such as Wagner to further Russian foreign policy goals; their widespread use by states leads to both human rights abuses as well as increased instability, chaos, and brutality, all in the name of counter-insurgency operations.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.