Trouble in the Tigray: Ethiopia’s Next Civil War?
Image courtesy of Office of Prime Minister of, Ethiopia, via wikimedia, some rights reserved.
“War is the epitome of hell for all involved… [it] makes for bitter men. Heartless and savage men.” These were the words of Abiy Ahmed, current prime minister of Ethiopia, when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peace settlement with neighbouring Eritrea. Hailed as a new start for Ethiopia, Abiy promised to bring a liberal reforming agenda to a country tainted by a history of division. Yet, just eleven months after receiving the peace prize, he has initiated a conflict which may just take Ethiopia back to a time it so wishes to leave behind.
On November 4th, with the eyes of the world preoccupied by the US election, Abiy launched an offensive in the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the areas local government, in response to an alleged attack on federal troops in the region’s capital of Mekelle. What has since emerged is a bloody conflict, with reports of ethnically based massacres and a potentially serious refugee crisis in the making. It threatens the substantial growth Ethiopia has made in the past few decades, and could seriously fragment the nation. But how did it get to this point, and is there any hope for a peaceful solution before the breakout of an all-out civil war?
To understand the build-up which led to November’s confrontation, one must look back to the late 20th century. In 1991, the Marxist-Leninist regime of Ethiopia was overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a four-way coalition consisting of different ethnically based parties. Under the governance of prime minister Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF led the country through a period of sustained economic and infrastructural growth over the following two decades. However, whilst the coalition consisted of four different groups, there was one in particular which dominated: the TPLF.
Despite Tigrayans only making up approximately six percent of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF held the vast majority of power in what was largely a politically repressive and authoritarian regime. Given the incredibly diverse ethnic makeup of Ethiopia, with the state being split up into ten separate ethnically defined self-governed regions, the TPLF’s undue influence bred resentment, eventually leading to mass protests. After years of unlawful executions and imprisonments by the state’s security forces, the conflict was resolved in 2018 by the appointment of a new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed.
As the youngest leader in Africa, Abiy’s rise to power was a ray of hope for the country. Adopting a reformist manifesto, the first year of his tenure was remarkably positive; he freed political prisoners, made peace with Eritrea after a twenty year conflict (which he himself had fought in), and reinstated many opposition groups. Furthermore, with his vision of medemer, which seeks the unification of the country’s ethnic groups under a pan-Ethiopian guise, it was hoped that Abiy’s leadership would ease existing tensions. On paper, he was exactly the leader Ethiopia needed. But, as with many leaders prematurely awarded with Nobel Peace Prizes, there was a darker side to Abiy’s regime.
In order to consolidate his power, Abiy purged the remaining Tigrayan’s from government. Unsurprisingly, this provoked the TPLF, who accused Abiy of using a liberal front in order to strengthen the authority of central government and undermine that of regional governments. This has led to the groups consistent opposition against Abiy, best exemplified through their hosting of a separate election within Tigray despite the delay of the general election as a result Covid-19. In response to this, Abiy did not seek compromise, but rather continued to reduce the groups political and economic control; in the eyes of the TPLF, conflict was the only adequate response.
This confrontation escalated to a new level on November 4th when the TPLF provoked the federal government through its attack on a military base in Mekelle. Since then, the situation has continued to deteriorate, with neither side showing any signs of cooperation. Whilst Abiy is confident the federal forces will be able to oust the TPLF from government in a matter of weeks, this appears unlikely. The Tigrayan force may be smaller than the Ethiopian National Defence Force, but its history of fighting against the Marxists in 1991 and Eritrea in 1998 has left it a battle-hardened group with experience of guerrilla conflict. As such, fighting will almost certainly involve heavy losses.
On the wider domestic stage, the fighting in Tigray will have significant ramifications. Abiy is already facing calls for separation by other ethnic groups within Ethiopia, such as the Oromo’s, whom have continually been repressedthroughout his administration. If such groups are able to capitalise on the situation for their own ends, what could emerge is the countries break up among ethnic lines in a similar manner to the former Yugoslavia, undoubtably crippling the states potential for prosperity.
Further afield, civil war threatens to destabilise the rest of the Horn of Africa. Eritrea has already been dragged into the conflict by the TPLF who, accusing Abiy of working in cooperation with the Eritreans, recently bombed their capital of Asmara. A huge influx of refugees has also been reported in Sudan, a country which in no way has an infrastructure capable of sustaining such an intake, creating a potential refugee crisis in the near future. Furthermore, it may also be the case that stronger regional neighbours seek to exploit the situation in Ethiopia. In the case of the Nile conflict I wrote about in October, Egypt may use Ethiopia’s distraction in order to gain leverage over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project and halt its filling. The overall picture, therefore, is bleak to say the least.
However, the wide-ranging impact of the conflict could it itself form part of the antidote. Outside of Africa, investmentinto Ethiopia by China and the West, coupled with the strategic interest of the US in the Horn of Africa, means wealthy states have a critical interest that war is avoided. Given the traction the conflict has also been gaining among human rights groups and the United Nations, it would not be surprising to see a multilateral response to the situation. The key is to act early, for the West, and in particular the incoming Biden administration, does not want to find itself dragged back into the Horn of Africa like it was in the 1990s.
It is of no doubt that Ethiopia is staring down the barrel of civil war. Should Abiy Ahmed and the TPLF continue direct confrontation, the country could face a devastating humanitarian crisis with tragic consequences. Whilst it seems unlikely, it is up to both sides to show signs of compromise if any peace talks are to be initiated. In the meantime, the rest of the world will be watching in anticipation, hoping that Africa does not find itself with yet another domestic conflict on its hands. If it does, Abiy will have done what he himself so deeply condemns: turned the people’s “dream of peace” into a “nightmare of war.”
